Worker Bargaining Power and Market Tightness: Theory and Evidence
What determines worker bargaining power, the share of employment surplus that workers capture? Standard wage bargaining models allow outside options to affect wages, but typically treat the bargaining weight governing the division of surplus as an exogenous parameter. I endogenise bargaining power in a model where workers and firms take turns making wage offers while continuing to meet and choose among potential partners. In tighter labour markets, where vacancies are more plentiful relative to job seekers, firms are less likely to find alternative workers. Workers can therefore reject an unattractive wage offer with less risk of losing their bargaining partner before they can make a counteroffer. This strengthens workers' bargaining power, increasing their share of match surplus and the pass-through of firm productivity into wages. Using French matched employer–employee data, I find that an increase of one standard deviation in labour market tightness raises the pass-through of the firm's hourly marginal product of labour into wages by 13%, from 3.3 to 3.7 cents per euro.
Presented at: SAEe 2026 (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria), EWMES 2026 (Warsaw), Fourth Women in Central Banking Workshop (Mexico City), 41st AIEL Conference (Rome), EALE 2026 (Barcelona), EAYE 2026 (Bilbao)